What difference does it make if the state makes people vote? The question is central to normative debates about the rights and duties of citizens in a democracy, and to contemporary policy debates in a number of Latin American countries over what actions states should take to encourage electoral participation. Focusing on a rare case of abolishing compulsory voting in Venezuela, this article shows that not forcing people to vote yielded a more unequal distribution of income. The evidence supports Arend Lijphart's claim, advanced in his 1996 presidential address to the American Political Science Association, that compulsory voting can offset class bias in turnout and, in turn, contribute to the equality of influence. To make contributions to these debates and recent studies, this article focuses on the political and policy consequences that followed a rare case of abolishing compulsory voting in Venezuela. Specifically, it provides empirical support for the proposition that compulsory voting can reduce income inequality.
W
hat difference does it make if more or fewer people vote? What difference would it make if the state made people vote? These questions are central to normative debates about the rights and duties of citizens in a democracy (Lacroix 2007; Lever 2010) and to contemporary policy debates over what actions states should take to encourage electoral participation (Ellis et al. 2006) . They are also central to a surge of research examining the effects of compulsory voting in Latin America on important topics, ranging from the rate of invalid ballots cast in elections (Kouba and Lysek 2016) to overall satisfaction with democracy (Singh 2016) and from the rise of "outsider" presidential candidates (Carreras 2012) to the conditional effect of social assistance programs on electoral support for incumbent parties (Layton and Smith 2015) .
To make contributions to these debates and recent studies, this article focuses on the political and policy consequences that followed a rare case of abolishing compulsory voting in Venezuela. Specifically, it provides empirical support for the proposition that compulsory voting can reduce income inequality.
In his 1996 presidential address to the American Political Science Association, Arend Lijphart contended that class bias, "the inequality of representation and influ-ence . . . not randomly distributed but systematically biased in favor of more privileged citizens . . . and against less advantaged citizens," is the central "unresolved dilemma" of democracy (Lijphart 1997, 1) . The normative foundation of this argument is that in a democracy, the preferences of every citizen should have equal weight in determining policy. Lijphart contends that "low voter turnout means unequal and socioeconomically biased turnout . . . [and] unequal participation spells unequal influence" (2). From this, he concludes that compulsory voting is "the strongest of all the institutional factors" (8) in its potential to remedy the pernicious effects of class bias in turnout.
Lijphart's presidential address, published in the American Political Science Review, has been cited widely and has motivated many scholars to investigate the impact of voter turnout on electoral outcomes. Empirical studies, however, have faced an array of challenges. Simple cross-sectional regressions lack a convincing identification strategy for causal inference. Instrumental variables based on exogenous "shocks" to turnout (e.g., weather events) are irrelevant to Lijphart's central claim that the level of voter turnout, influenced by whether voting is compulsory or mandatory, would affect policy outcomes. 1 Two recent studies address these methodological concerns and focus on the introduction of compulsory voting in Australia (Fowler 2013) and in Austria (Bechtel et al. 2015) . By examining subnational units that adopted compulsory voting within federal systems, these studies gain analytical leverage in examining a counterfactual question: what would have happened if compulsory voting had not been introduced? Consistent with Lijphart's proposition that compulsory voting mitigates class bias in voter turnout, they connect increases in voter turnout, support for leftist parties (or policy positions), and government spending to compulsory voting. The subnational effects they estimate, however, do not map directly onto national-level policy outcomes, which are often subjects of both scholarly and political debate.
This study extends this line of inquiry by examining the abolishment of compulsory voting in Venezuela in the early 1990s. Venezuela is one of a few countries that enforced compulsory voting for a long period but then dropped it. Among these cases, Venezuela offers the most promising environment to study downstream, national-level political and socioeconomic consequences of turnout bias-the ultimate outcome variable for Lijphart. The other countries are not suitable for this inquiry because they abolished compulsory voting before reliable data on economic inequality were available (Spain and the Netherlands), abolished it too recently to estimate downstream effects (Chile), or retained the legal requirement in some regions after the national-level statute was eliminated (Switzerland and Austria).
This article proceeds to review Lijphart's theory, along with the evidence for its various elements in the empirical literature from Latin America and other contexts. It goes on to provide an in-depth qualitative study of the Venezuelan case. It presents quantitative evidence by running difference-in-differences regression models that estimate the effect on income inequality. The results suggest that not forcing people to vote yielded a more unequal distribution of income in Venezuela than would have obtained had compulsory voting been maintained. The article then discusses alternative interpretations and shows the results of further tests. Noting that Hugo Chávez's election later in the 1990s fundamentally altered Venezuela's electoral landscape, the concluding section discusses what the study's results can and cannot say about the Chávez phenomenon, along with broader policy implications.
LIJPHART'S THEORY OF UNEQUAL INFLUENCE
Lijphart's central argument is that compulsory voting is the strongest remedy for unequal political influence due to unequal turnout. An observable implication derived from the argument is that income is more unequally distributed when voting is voluntary than if it were compulsory. Making the underlying assumptions in Lijphart's theory explicit is key to understanding the mechanisms connecting compulsory voting and income inequality.
The first assumption is that socioeconomic status is a proxy for preferences about economic policies that reduce inequality. Specifically, Lijphart assumes that the poor prefer policies that minimize inequality more than the rich do. Such policies include progressive taxation on incomes and comprehensive tax deductions for the poor. Just as important-given that economically less advantaged people are more susceptible to job market fluctuation and more dependent on public sector jobs-the poor should have a stronger preference than the rich for public spending (Mainwaring et al. 2015) .
The second assumption is that when voting is voluntary, its net utility is greater for the rich than for the poor. There are various reasons that this might be the case. For example, the rich might have more riding on policymakers' decisions. In a country where only a minority earns sufficient formal income to pay income taxes, marginal tax rates will be of little consequence to most citizens but highly salient to the rich (Kasara and Suryanarayan 2015) . Voting may also be more onerous for the poor. Poverty corresponds everywhere with low education levels, so the efforts required for voters to gain information about candidates and policy platforms should be larger for the poor than the rich (Downs 1957; Matsusaka 1995) . 2 The costs can also be logistical. The poor may lack transportation or flexible work schedules that allow access to the polls.
In short, when voting is voluntary, turnout should be higher among the rich than the poor; that is, there should be a positive socioeconomic bias to participation.
3 Such bias is strong and longstanding in the United States (Jackson et al. 1998; Leighley and Nagler 1992) , and has been documented in various other national contexts as well (Carlin and Love 2015; Hooghe and Pelleriaux 1998; Jaitman 2013; Irwin 1974; Martikainen et al. 2005; Singh 2011a; Tingsten 1937) . 4 The third assumption is that imposing sanctions on nonvoters should mitigate this bias. This should be the case particularly insofar as sanctions such as fines weigh more heavily on the poor than the rich.
5 Previous studies have shown that voter turnout is high as long as compulsory voting is enforced with substantial punish-ments (Fowler 2013; Jackman 2001) and that socioeconomic bias in turnout is mitigated under compulsory voting (Singh 2011b (Singh , 2015 Carlin and Love 2015) .
Conditional on these first three assumptions made by Lijphart, the median voter's position is expected to shift to the right under voluntary voting relative to compulsory voting. The final assumption is that the elected government responds to shifts in the median voter's preference. 6 As a result, when compulsory voting is introduced (or abolished), the elected government should pursue policies that result in making the distribution of income more (or less) equal. Following Lijphart's theory and the logical assumptions underlying it, a shift from compulsory to voluntary voting is expected to draw the following observable implications: a decline in voter turnout, a shift to the right in the preference of the wealthier median voter, the election of politicians who support less redistribution, the implementation of less progressive economic policies, and an increase in economic inequality. 7 We will examine the empirical validity of the first four effects in the context of Venezuela, and then examine the validity of the fifth and final effect.
THE CASE OF VENEZUELA
Throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, Venezuelans' confidence in their political institutions declined. In response, the government adopted a variety of electoral reforms during the time period under consideration. In 1984, President Jaime Lusinchi created the Presidential Commission on the Reform of the State (COPRE) to propose reforms aimed at reestablishing citizen engagement and trust. COPRE-initiated reforms included direct elections of mayors and candidate-preference votes within lists for municipal councilors in 1988, direct elections of state governors in 1989, and then in 1993 the introduction of a mixed system for the Chamber of Deputies, together with the end of compulsory voting. These latter two reforms are of particular interest because of their potential connection to the politics of redistribution.
From 1958 to 1988, Venezuelan legislators were elected using a closed-list proportional representation (PR) system, with the country's states as districts. The 1993 reform shifted Chamber of Deputies elections to a mixed-member system resembling Germany's, in which half the seats are contested by plurality in single-member districts (SMDs) and the other half are allocated to achieve overall proportionality. The electoral law of 1958 also established compulsory voting, along with the specific sanctions for nonparticipation, which included restrictions on employment for, or contracting with, public entities; on conducting bank transactions; on holding public office; on securing a passport or traveling outside the country; and on enrolling in a state university, all for a period of six months after the election in which a citizen did not vote (Rosales 1986 ). Congress eliminated sanctions in the Organic Suffrage Law of 1993 (Molina and Pérez Baralt 1995, 1996) . 8 The coincidence of proportional elections and compulsory voting raises the question of whether the former change affected the politics of income inequality. Both Austen-Smith (2000) and Iversen and Soskice (2006) argue that PR elections encourage, and SMDs discourage, progressive redistribution. Scholarly debate on the effects of SMD versus PR on redistribution has not yet concluded. Chang et al. (2011) , for example, make the converse argument that SMD competition yields policies with diffuse economic benefits and PR encourages concentration of benefits.
In the context of Venezuela's electoral reform, we believe that there are reasons to be cautious about applying either model proposed by Austen-Smith (2000) or Iversen and Soskice (2006) . First, although Venezuela's reform created SMD competition for half the Chamber's seats, the overall distribution of seats remained proportional, mitigating the Duvergerian imperative of SMD competition on which both models depend. Second, in the Iversen and Soskice model, the redistributive effect is driven by differences between multiparty and two-party parliaments in the formation of coalition governments, whereas Venezuela was, and remains, a presidential system. For these reasons, we argue, the theoretical grounds to expect an impact on income distribution from abandoning compulsory voting are stronger than from the shift to a mixed electoral system. Nevertheless, it is worth taking seriously the prospect that the mixed system reform could affect economic inequality, and we return to test the proposition empirically in a later section. For now, we focus on the logical sequence underpinning Lijphart's theory of compulsory voting.
The first link in that causal chain is that turnout should decline when compulsory voting is abandoned. This effect was clear and well documented in the Venezuelan case (Molina 1995; Molina and Pérez Baralt 1995) . Voter turnout in national elections had been above 75 percent in every election since the adoption of compulsory voting. Specifically, it was 80 percent in 1958 , 75 percent in 1963 , 92 percent in 1968 , 90 percent in 1973 , 79 percent in 1978 , 83 percent in 1983 , and 80 percent in 1988 (Molina 1995 . As soon as sanctions for nonvoting ceased, in the 1993 election, however, turnout sharply dropped to 54 percent, 20 percentage points below the lowest turnout during the period with compulsory voting.
The second link holds that the turnout drop should be concentrated more heavily among poorer voters than wealthier voters, diminishing demand for progressive redistribution. Venezuelan surveys provide some leverage here, although the data are less than ideal (Baloyra and Torres 1983; Canache 2002) . A pre-election survey in 1983 that asked voters to recall their participation ten and five years earlier, in the 1973 and 1978 elections, found 6.9 percent and 10.4 percent gaps, respectively, in reported participation between the top and bottom income quartiles. A 1995 survey asking voters to recall participation in the 1993 election produced a corresponding gap of 12.4 percent. This may suggest a widening gap after the abolishment of compulsory voting, but the increase is only a marginal one and subject to all the limitations of respondents' recall over long time periods.
Surveys that asked more directly about the effects of compulsory voting show more pronounced differences across income groups. The 1983 survey mentioned above, for instance, asked whether respondents intended to vote in the upcoming election that year, and whether they would vote if voting were not compulsory (Baloyra and Torres 1983) . Virtually all respondents, regardless of socioeconomic status, expressed an intention to vote, but only 25 percent of those in the lowest income quartile indicated they would do so if voting were not compulsory, com-pared with 54 percent in the top income quartile. Similarly, a survey conducted in 1993, two months before compulsory voting was struck from the electoral law, asked whether respondents would vote that year if voting were not obligatory. The survey dichotomizes all respondents into a low-income group (88 percent of respondents) and a high-income group (12 percent), but one-third of the poorer respondents said they would not vote if it were not compulsory, as compared with onefifth of the wealthier group (CIEPA 1993) . Subject to the limitations of these data, there is suggestive evidence that compulsory voting diminished socioeconomic bias in participation below levels that would apply under voluntary voting.
Beyond the size and composition of the electorate, the next places to look for effects are in electoral outcomes-which parties and politicians are elected-and in their policies that affect the distribution of wealth. The period of our investigation was one of enormous turbulence, economically and politically, following decades during which Venezuela had been regarded as an island of relative prosperity and stability in a much stormier Latin American sea. Venezuelan democracy during this period has been well chronicled (Coppedge 1994 (Coppedge , 1996 Crisp 2000; Karl 1997) . Does that history suggest a shift in the median voter's preference?
For our purposes, the top panel of figure 1 provides a schematic of party competition from the 1960s through the 1980s, when Venezuelan elections were dominated by the center-left social democratic Acción Democrática (AD) and the center-right Christian Democratic (COPEI) parties, with a regular, much smaller electoral presence of smaller parties, under varying labels, on the left. AD and COPEI dominated all seven national elections from 1958 to 1988, taking more than 85 percent of the votes between them in each of the last four contests. Throughout the long period in which voting was compulsory, Venezuelans grew familiar with a set of options with established locations on a left-right ideological spectrum. The center-left AD had the strongest claim to Venezuela's median voter, winning five of seven presidential elections from 1958 to 1988.
By 1993, however, Venezuela had experienced a period of economic crisis and political discontent under AD president Carlos Andrés Pérez. The contest for COPEI's presidential nomination that year split the party. Rafael Caldera, who had founded COPEI in the 1950s and had served as president from 1968 to 1973, had resuscitated his political career with a speech in the Senate in 1992 decrying the disproportionate burdens that economic reforms at the time were imposing on the poor. Caldera's attempt to recapture COPEI's nomination for the presidency failed, however, and he bolted the party to run with the backing of a coalition of smaller parties spanning the ideological spectrum (Buxton 2003; Di John 2005) . The coalition ran under the banner Convergencia.
The second panel of figure 1 locates the main presidential contenders in the 1993 election according to the most comprehensive data on ideological placement of presidential candidacies in Latin America (Baker and Greene 2011) .
9 Specifically, it shows each party's ideological position on a continuous scale ranging from 1 (leftmost) to 20 (rightmost). AD (ideological position = 11.4), discredited by Pérez's presidency, hemorrhaged voters to its competitors on both flanks. Causa Radical (ideological position = 7.9) was one beneficiary, more than doubling the left's traditional vote share, but on the right, Caldera's Convergencia and the rump COPEI (ideological position for both camps = 14.8) won a majority of the vote. In the fourway race, Caldera's 31 percent was sufficient to capture the presidency.
This account of events is consistent with Lijphart's premise that moving from compulsory to voluntary voting should produce a class bias in abstention that pushes the median voter right, diminishing demand for progressive redistribution. To recap, the center-left AD dominated elections during the period with compulsory voting, but the winner of the first election without compulsory voting in 1993, Caldera, was center-right.
Before embracing this interpretation unconditionally, however, it is important to acknowledge that narrative accounts of Venezuelan politics in this period portray a fluid electoral environment in which ideological locations of candidacies were hard to pin down. When he was elected in 1988, AD's Pérez had, like Caldera, previously served as president-in his case, from 1973 to 1978, during an oil boom. Venezuelans associated Pérez with generous government spending, and he did little to dissuade this expectation during his 1988 campaign (Buxton 2003) . Once inaugurated, however, Pérez imposed an economic austerity package described as the Gran Viraje (Great Turnaround). Cuts in fuel subsidies translated into public transportation rate hikes, which in turn sparked a series of riots in February 1989 known as the Caracazo. Pérez called out the military, whose heavy-handed response left more than 350 dead (Di John 2005) .
The president's approval ratings dropped from about 50 percent to 35 percent during his first year in office (Stokes 2001 was threatened by two separate military coup attempts in 1992, neither successful, but the first of them made a media celebrity out of a young colonel with a gift for populist rhetoric, Hugo Chávez. A scandal involving government appropriations prompted Pérez's removal from office and replacement by an interim president for the last year of his term. When he ran in 1993, Caldera excoriated the economic hardship imposed on the poor under Pérez's administration (Buxton 2003 ). Pérez's Gran Viraje had pulled the AD to the right, and Caldera's 1993 incarnation was an effort to move left from the traditional COPEI that Caldera himself had helped to found four decades earlier.
This alternative narrative raises the question of whether the 1993 electoral result genuinely represented a rightward shift. The longstanding reputations of the main actors, as well as the most authoritative dataset on candidate ideologies, suggest that it did (Baker and Greene 2011 ). Yet the electoral environment was tumultuous, and the traditional party system was disintegrating. For a clearer picture of the political and economic flux of those years, we turn to the economic policies these successive administrations pursued. Figure 2 plots the share of GDP accounted for by government consumption of goods and services, plus government (gross) investment expenditures, against (net) Gini coefficients, our measure of inequality after government taxes and transfers. 10 The vertical bars show the 95 percent confidence interval for the Gini estimates. Government consumption levels (gray dots) bounced around during Carlos Andrés Pérez's second term , on net decreasing from just above 32 percent in 1989 to just above 30 percent in 1993. The 1993 level, however, is barely below the level from 1988, the year before Pérez's Gran Viraje package of economic reforms. Overall, given the measurement error inherent in the Gini coefficients, there is no statistically discernible movement in inequality during the Pérez years. This is an important but perhaps counterintuitive finding. Pérez is often portrayed as the president who promoted drastic neoliberal reforms, but neither the government share of GDP nor the Gini coefficient changed substantially during his term.
The pattern becomes dramatic only under Caldera's administration (black dots in figure 2), when government spending dropped sharply and monotonically, with corresponding increases in our measure of inequality. The negative correlation (−0.76, 1989-98) between these variables suggests that the post-1993 austerity policies were an important determinant of the increase in inequality.
Summary
Venezuelan politics from 1988 to 1998 were buffeted by an array of forces broader than just the end of compulsory voting, but the available evidence we encounter is consistent with the proposition that the end of compulsory voting decreased participation, increased socioeconomic bias, and pushed the center of gravity in the Venezuelan electorate to the right. The policy changes that ensued increased inequality. Although Pérez's Gran Viraje is often characterized as a pivotal moment in accounts of Venezuelan politics of the period, neither the share of the economy accounted for by government spending nor conventional measures of income inequality changed under his government. The economic data suggest that it was Caldera's administration that exposed, more systematically, the vulnerability of the poorest Venezuelans.
ESTIMATING THE EFFECT ON INEQUALITY
We now examine more systematically the final and most consequential effect of Lijphart's theory: the effect of abandoning compulsory voting on income inequality. Before introducing our data, statistical models, and findings, we should respond to a potential criticism derived from the fact that ours is inherently a single-country study.
One may argue that it is impossible to make any causal interpretation focusing only on Venezuela.
11 We acknowledge that a simple time series analysis without any [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] Note: The vertical axis shows the averages of multiply imputed Gini coefficients in the SWIID data. The vertical lines associated with them indicate the 95 percent confidence intervals. The Government Share of GDP includes government consumption of goods and services and government (gross) investment. In each of the six years up through 1993, Government Share of GDP switched direction (i.e., rising, falling, rising, etc.), whereas it declined monotonically starting in 1994. Sources : Feenstra et al. 2013; Solt 2009 Solt , 2013 comparison unit does not warrant causal interpretation. Our approach, instead, is to apply a difference-in-differences design. 12 Our comparison units are a set of Latin American countries that are similar to Venezuela in important respects. This section explains the selection of comparison units, time periods, and statistical models. The next section addresses key questions confronting any analysis of the consequences of a specific policy change: was the change intentional? and did other changes occur at the same time?
Data
To measure income inequality, we rely on the net (i.e., after-tax, after-transfer) Gini coefficient as measured by the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID), Version 4.0 (Solt 2009 (Solt , 2013 ). An advantage of using the SWIID dataset is that it has greater coverage across countries and over time than any other crossnational income inequality database. Specifically, by combining a variety of existing data, including the United Nations University's World Income Inequality Database (WIID) and the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), the SWIID dataset provides comparable Gini coefficients for 173 countries for as many years as possible from 1960 to 2012.
13
The question we examine in this statistical analysis is, what was the estimated trajectory of income inequality had Venezuela not experienced a change in 1993? To examine this counterfactual question, we apply a difference-in-differences design using cross-national, time series data. In this design, it is important to choose a set of countries that share historical, political, economic, and social context with Venezuela. Specifically, we choose the Latin American and Caribbean countries that were net oil exporters as of 1993: Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Trinidad and Tobago. These countries share similar regional economic conditions; moreover, focusing on oil exporters is relevant because the abundance of natural resources is often correlated with both economic growth and disparity.
14 It is important that none of these countries introduced or abolished compulsory voting during the period of investigation. Venezuela is the only "treated" case in which the requirement to vote in elections changed.
Specifically, we use three periods of investigation, 1978-98, 1983-98, and 1988-98 . The numbers of observations are 127, 102, and 76, respectively. The coefficient estimates using shorter periods are less efficient, due to smaller numbers of observations, but country-specific trend variables, which we will introduce shortly, may more accurately capture subtle fluctuation in income inequality in each country. Since we do not have a priori a theoretical expectation about the "right" period of investigation, we try the three different periods.
These periods include four elections: those of 1978, 1983, and 1988-the last three elections before the elimination of sanctions in Venezuela-and the subsequent 1993 election. We do not extend the postreform period beyond 1998. The 1998 presidential election was marked by the landslide victory of Chávez, who had attempted a coup d'état in 1992 and who remained in the presidency until his death in 2013. The rise of Chavismo is expected to add additional systematic variation to the post-1993 trajectories of income inequality. This means that the longer the postreform period for our analysis, the more difficult it would become to interpret the direct effect of "treatment" (i.e., in our case, the change that occurred in 1993). Methodologically, post-1993 changes in politics and policies are "posttreatment" events, which are partly consequences of the reform in 1993. Incorporating posttreatment factors into our statistical analysis and estimating mediation effects would introduce methodological challenges beyond the scope of this article (Imai et. al. 2011; Rosenbaum 1984) .
Statistical Models
The difference-in-differences design is a technique with a long tradition in social science research aimed at estimating the effect of an event, intervention, or "treatment." It uses time series observations that include periods both prior and subsequent to the event-in our case, the abolishment of compulsory voting in Venezuela in 1993. 15 We run the following regression model using the cross-national and time series data.
The outcome variable Y it is the net Gini coefficient for country i in year t. The base category (i = 0, t = 0) is Venezuela in 1993. Accordingly, the intercept coefficient b 0 predicts the Gini coefficient in Venezuela in 1993. There are two treatment variables. The first treatment T 1it is 1 for Venezuela after 1993 (exclusive), while it is 0 otherwise. Formally, T 1it = 1(i = 0, t > 0). The second treatment T 2it is the number of years since 1993 for Venezuela, T 2it = t · 1(i = 0, t > 0). While the coefficient b 1 measures the average change in the outcome variable in Venezuela after 1993, the coefficient b 2 measures the annual increase in the outcome variable in Venezuela after 1993. After running this model, we then undertake a Chow test (Chow 1960) . The null hypothesis we intend to reject is that these coefficients are jointly zero: H 0 : b 1 = b 2 = 0; namely, there is no "structural break" in Venezuela in 1993.
The model also includes country-specific trend variables f i (t), country-specific fixed effects v i , and year-specific fixed effects u t . The last term e it denotes a stochastic disturbance. Since we do not have a priori theory on the functional form for the country-specific trajectories of the Gini coefficient during the entire period of investigation, we repeat the analysis using linear and quadratic trends. In total, we run six regression models: three periods (1978-98, 1983-98, and 1988-98 ) × two functional forms (linear and quadratic). 16 We do not add other country-specific and time-variant covariates for two reasons. First, as we discussed earlier, the postreform observations for these countryspecific and time-variant variables are likely to be influenced by the reform of 1993 itself. Therefore, adding these variables could introduce posttreatment bias (Rosen-baum 1984) . The observations before the reform are obviously not influenced by the reform itself, but we assume that the average effects of these variables on the outcome variable are, to a large extent, captured by the country-specific trend variables. Furthermore, the country-specific and year-specific fixed effects control for any country-specific attributes (for example, demographics, or political and economic history) and any time-specific attributes (for example, years in which major economic shocks occurred at the global level, such as changes in the prices of natural resources and financial commodities).
In addition, we note an important assumption required for a valid differencein-differences design, which is called the parallel-trend assumption. Conditional on all country-specific fixed effects, year-specific fixed effects, and country-specific trend variables, we assume that the trends in the outcome variable during the pretreatment period are similar among the countries included in our analysis. More important, conditional on these variables, the outcome variable for the treated group would have been the same, had there been no treatment, as the trend in the outcome variable for the untreated group. Since this assumption for causal identification is about the difference in two potential outcomes, it is fundamentally unverifiable. In practice, researchers must assume that there was no important changeother than the treatment itself-that influenced the trajectory of the outcome variable in the treated group. The importance of this assumption motivates our placebo tests using the cases of Trinidad and Tobago and Bolivia.
Results
Regression results are presented in table 1. Column P shows that the null hypothesis of no structural break in Venezuela in 1993 can be rejected in four of six models at the 5 percent level and at the 10 percent level in a fifth, suggesting that the trajectory of the Gini coefficient systematically changed in Venezuela in 1993. 17 Instead of interpreting how the trajectory changed by examining the coefficient estimates for the intercept and the two treatment variables (b 0 , b 1 , and b 2 ) presented in table 1, it is more intuitive to compare the factual and counterfactual trends graphically. Figure 3 summarizes this analysis for the period from 1983 to 1998. The height of each gray bar is the observed value of the Gini coefficient in Venezuela, whereas the solid dots are predicted values based on our regression analysis (see table 1 , 1983-98, Linear) .
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Venezuela's Gini coefficients gradually decreased from about 43 percent in 1983 to about 38 percent in 1992. This pattern changed after 1993, and the Gini coefficient increased to almost 45 percent until a year or two before the 1998 election. Figure 3 also shows a counterfactual trajectory. The hollow dots are predictions under an assumption that the coefficients for the Venezuela-specific, post-1993 changes were zero. Recall that we focus only on countries that are sufficiently similar to Venezuela as comparison units-that is, Latin American and Caribbean net oil exporters-and our difference-in-differences models control for all observable and unobservable country-specific and time-invariant factors, year-specific and country-invariant (that is, region-specific) factors, and country-specific trends (in two functional forms). Therefore, we interpret these additional dots as showing the Gini coefficients in Venezuela if there were no Venezuela-specific, systematic change after 1993 (i.e., when b 1 = b 2 = 0). 19 The gap between these factual and counterfactual trends represents our estimate of the treatment effects. Specifically, in figure 3 , the average effect during the five years after 1993 (i.e., 1994 to 1998) is 4.71 percentage points.
20

DISCUSSION
Strictly speaking, the results in table 1 and figure 3 show only that something happened in 1993 to change Venezuela's trajectory of economic inequality. Our qualitative analysis suggests that the abolishment of compulsory voting was the key treatment, but we want to rule out other potential explanations. Another important question is whether or not the increase in income inequality was an intended (or expected) consequence. (T 2it ) is the annual increase in the outcome variable in Venezuela after 1993 (exclusive). The null hypothesis is that the coefficients for these two treatment variables are jointly zero (H 0 : b 1 = b 2 = 0). The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Placebo Tests
The comparison set of countries was selected to match Venezuela's social, economic, regional, and political context. Yet some shared factors might be particularly important to understand how elections affect inequality. For example, perhaps trends in worldwide oil markets fostered sharp increases in inequality among heavily oildependent economies after 1993, or electoral rules other than compulsory voting contribute to inequality. We conducted placebo tests to explore these possibilities.
In the first, we replicated the difference-in-differences analysis reported in table 1 for Trinidad and Tobago, the country in our comparison set for which oil exports as a share of GDP are closest to Venezuela's. The results show that in none of the models can we reject (or even come close to rejecting) the null hypothesis of no structural break in 1993 for Trinidad and Tobago. Thus, we do not find evidence that 1993 was a pivotal year for the region's second most oil-dependent country. Our second placebo test builds on the fact that the end of compulsory voting in Venezuela coincided with the shift from pure PR elections for the legislature to a mixed-member proportional system. Our data include another country that implemented precisely the same reform during the time period under examination here. Bolivia had previously elected its Chamber of Deputies by proportional representa- (see table 1 , 1983 . The hollow dots are predictions under an assumption of no structural break in Venezuela in 1993 (i.e., when b 1 = b 2 = 0) Figure 3 . The Regression Results, Venezuela tion in department-level districts. 21 In 1994, Bolivia adopted a mixed-member proportional system, and held the first election under the new system in 1997. A number of other countries adopted mixed-member systems combining SMD and PR competition during the 1990s, including New Zealand, Italy, Japan, Russia, and Hungary. Bolivia's reform is the most closely analogous to Venezuela's insofar as both countries moved from pure, closed-list PR systems with regional districts to mixed-member compensatory systems. In this placebo test, the period of investigation is 1989-2002; the year of treatment is 1997. The length of the posttreatment period is the same as the one we use in our analysis of the case of Venezuela. Due to data limitation, however, the length of the pretreatment period is a bit shorter. Otherwise, we use the same statistical model and the same data source, and we run the same tests. The results show that none of the coefficients for the treatment variables is statistically significant, and the p values of the F statistics are very large. Therefore, we again fail to reject the null hypothesis of no structural break.
To sum up, our difference-in-differences analysis shows a structural break in 1993 for inequality in Venezuela, consistent with an explanation based on the end of compulsory voting. We replicated that analysis for two regional cousins for which competing explanations might apply. But we find no evidence that oil dependence in the mid-1990s or the electoral reform from a closed-list PR system to an MMP system accounts for the sharp increase in income inequality in Venezuela after 1993.
Intended or Unintended Consequences
In our effort to trace causal inference, we assume that Venezuela's intervention, the decision to abolish compulsory voting, was independent of the outcome we are interested in here, economic inequality. That is, if the abolition of compulsory voting were part of a broader effort to alter redistributive policies that shape economic inequality, then the counterfactual case would not provide an appropriate point of comparison.
To determine whether this presents a problem, we searched the archival record for evidence on what forces drove Venezuela's electoral reform. Deliberations over electoral reform in Venezuela in the late 1980s and early 1990s were extensive and involved a diverse array of actors, including social scientists, constitutional law scholars, and politicians from parties across the ideological spectrum. Was the potential impact of eliminating compulsory voting on economic inequality central to that debate?
As far back as the 1970s, academic observers of Venezuelan politics appeared to recognize the logic of the redistribution hypothesis when considering the potential effects of changes in turnout. Writing during the period of full enforcement of compulsory voting and highest turnout, Baloyra and Martz noted, "Electoral demobilization would introduce socioeconomic distinctions in voter turnout " (1979, 71) . A decade later, however, when debate over electoral reform was proceeding in earnest, the focus of discussion had shifted to the legitimacy of Venezuela's representative institutions.
The single largest source of archival materials on Venezuelan electoral reform is the Presidential Commission on the Reform of the State (COPRE). Drawing on academics, politicians, party functionaries, and civil society groups, COPRE produced dozens of reports and compilations that reflect an array of viewpoints on state reform during the years leading up to the end of compulsory voting. 22 Among COPRE's list of reports, we identified 11 volumes that address subjects of electoral reform and citizen participation. Carefully reviewing those, we found no discussion of the prospect that ending compulsory voting would affect political support for progressive redistribution in the Venezuelan electorate. We also reviewed publications on electoral reform proposals from Venezuela's Consejo Supremo Electoral from the same period (Rosales 1986; Zambrano 1989) , as well as assorted other academic publications, and similarly found no discussion of the redistribution hypothesis associated with compulsory voting.
Although we cannot know with certainty, or document comprehensively, the impetus for the abolition of compulsory voting in Venezuela, we find no evidence that the reform was part of a broader set of forces pushing against economic equality. Those engaged in the reform debate at the time and in the immediate aftermath did not focus on any socioeconomic bias in nonvoting. Indeed, the end of the voto obligatorio was part of a larger wave of electoral reforms that were pitched as egalitarian overall-empowering ordinary citizens relative to party leaders.
CONCLUSIONS
Given the subsequent rise of Hugo Chávez, any argument that the ideological location of Venezuela's median voter shifted to the right in the 1990s might appear perplexing. We emphasize that our claim about the shifting composition Venezuela's electorate and the subsequent policy implications is limited to the initial effect of abolishing compulsory voting in the early 1990s. We do not argue that the effect of abolishing compulsory voting should persist for a long period and be robust to any posttreatment political and economic change. Indeed, the policies that followed and their effects on the poorest Venezuelans might have pushed the electoral center of gravity back to the left by directly changing voter preferences on policy and how those preferences mapped onto candidate choice. Yet we urge caution about pushing such an interpretation too far, partly to resist the temptation of perfect hindsight.
We know, retrospectively, that Chávez became the icon of Latin America's new left, and we know about the redistributive policies he eventually pursued under the banner of twenty-first-century socialism (Penfold-Becerra 2007) . But much of that was far from clear when Chávez was initially elected, and even beyond. Drawing on a national survey taken just a couple of weeks before the 1998 election, Weyland (2003) found that respondents' economic class provided no leverage on their intention to vote for Chávez. Lupu (2010) found that class had a weak effect on retrospective reports of voting for Chávez as opposed to his main opponent, and that even that effect disappeared once responses from nonvoters were included in the sample. In short, it might appear that Chávez's election marked a dramatic pivot to the left in Venezuelan politics, but neither the scale of the shift nor the intentions of Venezuelan voters were anywhere near so apparent at the time (Zechmeister 2015) .
One might also ask why Chávez did not reintroduce compulsory voting when he overhauled Venezuela's institutional structure in 1999-2000. Although we cannot divine his intentions, Chávez might have pursued an alternative tack, strategic polarization of Venezuelan politics, toward an effect similar to that of compulsory voting. Data from across Latin America suggest that party system polarization, like compulsory voting, can mitigate socioeconomic bias in voter turnout while retaining the flexibility to demobilize some constituencies while mobilizing others (Corrales and Penfold 2007; Carlin and Love 2015) . There is evidence that Chávez preferred rules amenable to selective, rather than universal, mobilization (Hawkins and Hansen 2006; Hawkins 2010; Albertus 2016) . Still, recognizing that the political environment in Venezuela was turbulent at the time of the electoral reform and well after, we interpret our central result narrowly, focusing on the shift in the composition of Venezuela's electorate in 1993 and the electoral and policy results that followed in subsequent years before the rise of Chávez.
With regard to compulsory voting more generally, however, we emphasize that matters of economic redistribution belong front and center. Debates over compulsory voting are ongoing in a variety of countries, but discussion of the redistribution theory, which Lijphart forcefully advanced in 1996, is often muted. Colombia recently entertained the idea of adopting compulsory voting after not having done so in its nearly two-hundred-year history. Yet a sustained evaluation of the reform's virtues and drawbacks does not address economic redistribution (Ungar 2011) .
A recent Australian state government report on a proposal to end compulsory voting lists arguments in favor and against, but it does not mention potential redistributive consequences (Queensland Department of Justice and Attorney General 2013, 35). The Venezuelan results suggest that from a normative perspective, questions of inequality and redistribution belong at the center of debates over compulsory voting. Ending compulsory voting, and the subsequent drop-off in electoral participation, contributed to increasing economic inequality in the 1990s above levels Venezuelans would otherwise have experienced. 1. Chong and Olivera (2008) estimate the impact of compulsory voting on income inequality. Most of their estimates are based on cross-national regressions, but they also use questionable instrumental variables for robustness tests. Studies using the cross-national data confront another problem in that their treatment variable-whether a country has a compulsory voting system or not-is causally prior to almost all variables included in their models, because most countries that have compulsory voting introduced it many decades ago. Therefore, their control variables (or exogenous variables, in their two-stage least square regressions) are posttreatment variables, the inclusion of which can introduce bias in causal inference (Rosenbaum 1984) .
NOTES
2. In more recent cross-national studies, however, scholars have reached competing conclusions on whether compulsory voting mitigates stratification of participation by education (Gallego 2010; Quintelier et al. 2011) .
3. We do not use the word positive to imply any normative judgment but rather a simple positive correlation between wealth and voting.
4. Franklin (1999) and Kasara and Suryanarayan (2015) question the prevalence of positive turnout bias across nations. Our preliminary analysis, using the Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems and AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), however, supports the traditional view that positive bias is the norm cross-nationally and its inverse is extremely rare.
5. In the most recent study, Cepaluni and Hidalgo (2016) note that some sanctions for nonvoting, like obstacles to international travel or university enrollment, may hit the rich harder than the poor. Sanctions that weigh more heavily on lower socioeconomic classes, by contrast, such as restrictions on public-sector employment, should bias participation toward more advantaged groups. The evidence we gathered from Venezuela is consistent with the conventional wisdom that compulsory voting reduces socioeconomic bias, but how sanctions operate on individuals across different classes is a promising field of inquiry that warrants more attention. 6. We do not require a stronger assumption that governments accurately implement the preferred policy of the median voter. 7. A shift from voluntary to compulsory voting is expected to produce the opposite effect at each link of the causal chain.
8. Language describing voting as a duty remained in the constitution until the promulgation of the new charter in 1999. The elimination of any legal sanctions from 1993 on, however, marks that year as the end of compulsory voting. We thank José Enrique Molina (personal communication, January 21, 2013) for this account of the subtle changes in the de jure and de facto status of compulsory voting in Venezuela over time.
9. Unfortunately, the 1993 contest is the first Venezuelan election included in Baker and Greene's data, so we cannot use their index to measure change in the median party from 1988 to 1993. Coppedge (1998) provides an index of ideology by blocs (secular left, Christian left, secular center-left, etc.) rather than by parties, which suggests only a modest shift rightward between 1988 and 1993. But Coppedge's data are based on legislative, not presidential, election results. The structures of competition in the 1993 presidential and legislative races were fundamentally different. Most notably, Caldera won 31 percent of the presidential vote whereas his Convergencia coalition won only 14 percent in the legislative contest.
10. The data source for the government share as the percentage of GDP is Feenstra et al. 2013 . The data sources of the Gini coefficients and their uncertainty estimates are Solt 2009 Solt , 2013 11. Without the randomization of a treatment variable across units, making causal inference is always difficult in observations. We do not agree with an extreme claim that emphasizes the invalidity of all observational studies. We acknowledge that our analysis is based on a set of assumptions, which we make clear as much as possible in this section.
12. See Card and Krueger 1994 for a landmark example of such a design to study downstream effects of a policy change undertaken by a single state.
13. Another noticeable feature of the SWIID dataset is that it includes one hundred estimates of the Gini coefficient for each country in each year. With the one hundred multiply imputed estimates for each country in each year, we can obtain not only a point estimate (i.e., the average of multiply imputed values) but also an interval estimate of inequality.
14. Suriname was also a net oil exporter, but data on income inequality are not available for the time period under analysis. Data on oil exports are from Teorell et al. 2013. 15. There is a newer, nonparametric approach called the synthetic control method (Abadie et al. 2010 (Abadie et al. , 2015 Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003) . We prefer the traditional approach based on parametric regression, mainly because it is difficult to account for the uncertainty estimates of income inequality in the synthetic control method. In our preliminary research, we used the averages of one hundred multiply imputed estimates of income inequality as the outcome variable (see note 13), under a strong assumption that they were observed facts without uncertainty, and estimated the impacts of the intervention in 1993 on Venezuela's income inequality using the synthetic control method. The results are essentially similar to what we report here.
16. The results are largely consistent, which suggests that they are not idiosyncratic to the choice of model specification.
17. We also undertook permutation tests. For each of the countries included in the analysis, we estimated whether a structural change in the trajectory of income inequality took place in 1993. The model we estimated is exactly the same as the one we use for our main analysis. The results show that Venezuela was the only case clearly suggesting a structural change in 1993. Specifically, of the 36 non-Venezuelan model specifications, F tests suggest a structural break in only three (and only two at the 5 percent level).
18. To be more precise, the gray bars are the averages of multiply imputed SWIID data (see note 13).
19. Specifically, to calculate the counterfactual trend, we subtracted b^1T 1it + b 2 T 2it from the predicted value for each observation Y^i t . 20. To be more precise, the estimated effect in each of the post-1993 years is 1.089 + 1.207 × (Year -1993) . Thus, the five-year average is 1.089 + 1.207 × S 1998 i=1994 (i -1993)/5 = 4.71. (See also note 19.) Note that the estimated effect is slightly different depending on the model selection.
21. Bolivia's 9 departments are its main subnational political and administrative units, analogous to Venezuela's 24 states.
22. COPRE remained in existence until 1999, but its period of greatest activity was during the late 1980s and first years of the 1990s (Cuñarro Conde 2004) .
